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Abstract. A simple game (N, v) is given by a setN of n players and a partition
of 2N into a set L of losing coalitions L with value v(L) = 0 that is closed under
taking subsets and a set W of winning coalitions W with v(W ) = 1. Simple
games with α = minp≥0maxW∈W,L∈L p(L)p(W ) < 1 are known as weighted voting
games. Freixas and Kurz (IJGT, 2014) conjectured that α ≤ 1
4
n for every
simple game (N, v). We confirm this conjecture for two complementary cases,
namely when all minimal winning coalitions have size 3 and when no minimal
winning coalition has size 3. As a general bound we prove that α ≤ 2
7
n for every
simple game (N, v). For complete simple games, Freixas and Kurz conjectured
that α = O(
√
n). We prove this conjecture up to a lnn factor. We also prove
that for graphic simple games, that is, simple games in which every minimal
winning coalition has size 2, computing α is NP-hard, but polynomial-time
solvable if the underlying graph is bipartite. Moreover, we show that for every
graphic simple game, deciding if α < a is polynomial-time solvable for every
fixed a > 0.
1 Introduction
Cooperative Game Theory provides a mathematical framework for capturing situations
where subsets of agents may form a coalition in order to obtain some collective profit
or share some collective cost. Formally, a cooperative game (with transferable utilities)
consists of a pair (N, v), where N is a set of n agents called players and v : 2N → R+
is a value function that satisfies v(∅) = 0. In our context, the value v(S) of a coalition
S ⊆ N represents the profit for S if all players in S choose to collaborate with (only)
each other. The central problem in cooperative game theory is to allocate the total
profit v(N) of the grand coalition N to the individual players i ∈ N in a “fair” way. To
this end various solution concepts such as the core, Shapley value or nuclueolus have
been designed; see Chapter 9 of [23] for an overview.
In our paper we study simple games [26,31]. Simple games form a classical class
of games, which are well studied; see also the book of Taylor and Zwicker [29].4 The
notion of being simple means that every coalition either has some equal amount of
power or no power at all. Formally, a cooperative game (N, v) is simple if v is a
monotone 0–1 function with v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1, so v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N
and v(S) ≤ v(T ) whenever S ⊆ T . In other words, if v is simple, then there is a set
W ⊆ 2N of winning coalitions W that have value v(W ) = 1 and a set L ⊆ 2Nof losing
coalitions L that have value v(L) = 0. Note that N ∈ W, ∅ ∈ L and W ∪ L = 2N .
The monotonicity of v implies that subsets of losing coalitions are losing and supersets
of winning coalitions are winning. A winning coalition W is minimal if every proper
? This paper received support from the Leverhulme Trust (RPG-2016-258).
4 Sometimes simple games are defined without requiring monotonicity (see, for exam-
ple, [23]).
subset of W is losing, and a losing coalition L is maximal if every proper superset of
L is winning.
A simple game is a weighted voting game if there exists a payoff vector p ∈ Rn+
such that a coalition S is winning if p(S) ≥ 1 and losing if p(S) < 1. Weighted voting
games are also known as weighted majority games and form one of the most pop-
ular classes of simple games. Due to their practical applications in voting systems,
computer operating systems and model resource allocation (see e.g. [2,6]), structural
and computational complexity aspects for solution concepts for weighted voting games
have been thoroughly investigated [8,9,12,15]. However, it is easy to construct simple
games that are not weighted voting games. We give an example below, but in fact
there are many important simple games that are not weighted voting games, and the
relationship between weighted voting games and simple games is not yet fully under-
stood. Therefore, Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko [15] introduced a parameter
α, called the critical threshold value, to measure the “distance” of a simple game to
the class of weighted voting games:
α = α(N, v) = min
p≥0
max
W,L
p(L)
p(W )
, (1)
where the maximum is taken over all winning coalitions in W and all losing coalitions
in L. A simple game (N, v) is a weighted voting game if and only if α < 1.5 This follows
from observing that each optimal solution p of (1) can be scaled to satisfy p(W ) ≥ 1
for all winning coalitions W .
A concrete example of a simple game (N, v) that is not a weighted voting game and
that has in fact a large value of α was given in [11]. Let N = {1, . . . , n} for some even
integer n ≥ 4, and let the minimal winning coalitions be the pairs {1, 2}, {2, 3}, . . . {n−
1, n}, {n, 1}. Consider any payoff p ≥ 0 satisfying p(W ) ≥ 1 for every winning coali-
tion W . Then pi + pi+1 ≥ 1 for i = 1, . . . , n (where n + 1 = 1). This means that
p(N) ≥ 12n. Then, for at least one of L = {2, 4, 6, . . . , n} and L = {1, 3, 5, . . . , n− 1},
we have p(L) ≥ 14n, showing that α ≥ 14n. On the other hand, it is easily seen that
p ≡ 12 satisfies p(W ) ≥ 1 for all winning coalitions and p(L) ≤ 14n for all losing coali-
tions, showing that α ≤ 14n. Thus we conclude that α = 14n. Due to this somewhat
extreme example, the authors of [11] conjectured that α ≤ 14n for all simple games.
This conjecture turns out to be an interesting combinatorial problem.
Conjecture 1 [11]. For every simple game (N, v), it holds that α ≤ 14n.
1.1 Our Results
In Section 2 we prove that Conjecture 1 holds for the case where all minimal winning
coalitions have size 3 and for its complementary case where no minimal winning collec-
tion has size 3. We were not able to prove Conjecture 1 for all simple games. However,
in Section 3 we show that α ≤ 27n ≈ 0.2858n for every simple game.
In Section 4 we consider a subclass of simple games based on a natural desirability
order [24]. A simple game (N, v) is complete if the players can be ordered by a complete,
transitive ordering , say, 1  2  · · ·  n, indicating that higher ranked players have
more power (and are more desirable) than lower ranked players. More precisely, i  j
means that v(S ∪ {i}) ≥ v(S ∪ {j}) for any coalition S ⊆ N\{i, j}. The class of
complete simple games properly contains all weighted voting games [13]. For complete
simple games, we show a lower bound on α that is asymptotically lower than 14n,
namely α = O(
√
n lnn). This bound matches, up to a lnn factor, the lower bound of
Ω(
√
n) in [11] (conjectured to be tight in [11]).
5 If α ≤ 1, we speak of roughly weighted voting games [29].
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In Section 5 we discuss some algorithmic and complexity issues. We focus on in-
stances where all minimal winning coalitions have size 2. We say that such simple
games are graphic, as they can conveniently be described by a graph G = (N,E) with
vertex set N and edge set E = {ij | {i, j} is winning}. For graphic simple games
we show that computing α is NP-hard in general (see below for some related results).
On the positive side, we show that computing α is polynomial-time solvable if the
underlying graph G = (N,E) is bipartite, or if α is known to be small (less than a
fixed number a). We conclude with some remarks and open problems in Section 6.
1.2 Related Work
Another way to measure the distance of a simple game to the class of weighted voting
games is to use the dimension of a simple game [28], which is the smallest number
of weighted voting games whose intersection equals a given simple game. However,
computing the dimension of a simple game is NP-hard [7], and the largest dimension of
a simple game with n players is 2n−o(n) [20]. Moreover, simple games with dimension 1
have α = 1, but α may be arbitrarily large for simple games with dimension larger
than 1.6 Hence there is no direct relation between the two distance measures. We also
note that Gvozdeva, Hemaspaandra, and Slinko [15] introduced two other distance
parameters. One measures the power balance between small and large coalitions. The
other one allows multiple thresholds instead of threshold 1 only. See [15] for further
details.
For graphic simple games, it is natural to take the number of players n as the
input size for answering complexity questions, but in general simple games may have
different representations. For instance, one can list all minimal winning coalitions or
all maximal losing coalitions. Under these two representations the problem of deciding
if α < 1, that is, if a given simple game is a weighted voting game, is also polynomial-
time solvable. This follows from results of Hegedüs and Megiddo [16] and Peled and
Simeone [22], as shown by Freixas, Molinero, Olsen and Serna [12]. The latter authors
also showed that the same result holds if the representation is given by listing all
winning coalitions or all losing coalitions. Moreover, they gave a number of complexity
results of recognizing other subclasses of simple games.
We also note a similarity of our research with research into matching games. In
Section 2 we show that a crucial case in our study is when the simple game is graphic,
that is, defined on some graph G = (N,E). In the corresponding matching game a
coalition S ⊆ N has value v(S) equal to the maximum size of a matching in the
subgraph of G induced by S. One of the most prominent solution concepts is the core
of a game, defined by core(N, v) := {p ∈ Rn | p(N) = v(N), p(S) ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ N}.
A core allocation is stable, as no coalition has any incentive to object against it.
However, the core may be empty. Matching games are not simple games. Yet their core
constraints are readily seen to simplify to p ≥ 0 and pi+pj ≥ 1 for all ij ∈ E. Classical
solution concepts, such as the core and core-related ones like least core, nucleolus
or nucleon are well studied for matching games, see, for example, [3,4,10,18,19,27].
However, the problems encountered there differ with respect to the objective function.
For graphic simple games we aim to bound p(L) over all losing coalitions, subject to
p ≥ 0, pi + pj ≥ 1 for all ij ∈ E, whereas for matching games with an empty core
we wish to bound p(N), subject to p ≥ 0, pi + pj ≥ 1 for all ij ∈ E. Nevertheless,
basic tools from matching theory like the Gallai-Edmonds decomposition play a role
in both cases.
6 A simple game with 1
2
n players of type A and 1
2
n players of type B and minimal winning
coalitions consisting of one player of each type has dimension 2 and α = 1
4
n.
3
2 Two Complementary Cases
In this section we will consider the following two “complementary” cases: when all
winning coalitions have size equal to 3 (Section 2.1), and when no winning coalition
has size equal to 3 (Section 2.2). First observe that winning coalitions of size 1 do
not cause any problems. If {i} is a winning coalition of size 1, we satisfy it by setting
pi = 1. Since no losing coalition L contains i, we may remove i from the game and
solve (1) with respect to the resulting subgame. A similar argument applies if some
i ∈ N is not contained in any minimal winning coalition. We then simply define pi = 0
and remove i from the game. Thus, we may assume without loss of generality that all
minimal winning coalitions have size at least 2 and that they cover all of N .
2.1 All Minimal Winning Coalitions Have Size 2.
We first investigate the case where all minimal winning coalitions have size exactly 2.
This case (which is a crucial case in our study) can conveniently be translated to
a graph-theoretic problem. Let G = (N,E) be the graph with vertex set N whose
edges are exactly the minimal winning coalitions of size 2 in our game (N, v). Our
assumption that N is completely covered by minimal winning coalitions means that G
has no isolated vertices. Losing coalitions correspond to independent sets of vertices
L ⊆ N . Then the min max problem (1) becomes
α := αG := min
p
max
L
p(L), (2)
where the minimum is taken over all feasible pay-off vectors p, that is, p ∈ Rn+ with
pi + pj ≥ 1 for every ij ∈ E, and the maximum is taken over all independent sets
L ⊆ N .
We first consider the case where G = (A ∪B,E) is bipartite. To explain the basic
idea, we introduce the following concept (illustrated in Figure 1).
A S
B N(S)
Fig. 1. A well-spread bipartite graph.
Definition. Let G = (A ∪ B,E) be a bipartite graph of order n = |A|+ |B| without
isolated notes and assume without loss of generality that |A| ≤ |B|. Let λ ≤ 12 such
that |A| = λn (and |B| = (1− λ)n). We say that G is well-spread with parameter λ if
for all S ⊆ A we have
|S|
|N(S)| ≤
|A|
|B| =
λ
1− λ.
(Here, as usual, N(S) ⊆ B denotes the set of neighbors of S in B.)
Examples of well-spread bipartite graphs are biregular graphs or biregular graphs
minus an edge. Note that if G is well-spread with parameter λ ≤ 12 , then Hall’s
condition |N(S)| ≥ |S| for all S ⊆ A is satisfied, implying that A can be completely
matched to B (see, for example, [21]). The following lemma is the key observation.
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Lemma 1. Let G = (A ∪B,E) be well-spread with parameter λ ≤ 12 . Then p ≡ λ on
B and p ≡ 1− λ on A yields αG ≤ 14n.
Proof. Assume L ⊆ N is an independent set. Let ρ ≤ 1 such that |L∩A| = ρλn. Since
G is well-spread, we get |N(L ∩ A)| ≥ ρ(1 − λ)n, so that |L ∩ B| ≤ (1 − ρ)(1 − λ)n.
Thus
p(L) = |L ∩A|(1− λ) + |L ∩B|λ
≤ ρλn(1− λ) + (1− ρ)(1− λ)nλ
≤ ρ 14n+ (1− ρ) 14n
≤ 14n.
Hence we have proven the lemma. uunionsq
In general, when G = (A ∪B,E) is not well-spread, we seek to decompose G into
well-spread induced subgraphs Gi = (Ai ∪ Bi, Ei) with A =
⋃
Ai and B =
⋃
Bi. Of
course, this can only work if G = (A∪B,E) is such that A can be matched to B in G.
Proposition 1. Let G = (A∪B,E) be a bipartite graph without isolated vertices and
assume that A can be matched into B. Then G decomposes into well-spread induced
subgraphs Gi = (Ai ∪Bi, Ei), with A =
⋃
Ai and B =
⋃
Bi in such a way that for all
i, j with i < j, λi ≥ λj and no edges join Ai to Bj. uunionsq
Proof. Let S ⊆ A maximize |S|/|N(S). Set A1 := S and B1 := N(S). Let G′ be the
subgraph of G induced by A\A1 and B′ := B\B1. Then G′ satisfies the assumption
of the Proposition. Indeed, if A′ cannot be matched into B′ in G′, then there must be
some S′ ⊆ A′ with |S′| > |N ′(S′)|, where N ′(S′) = N(S′)\B1 is the neighborhood of
S′ in G′. But then |S ∪S′| = |S|+ |S′| and |N(S ∪S′)| ≤ |N(S)|+ |N ′(S)| shows that
S cannot maximize |S|/|N(S)|, a contradiction. Thus, by induction, we may assume
that G′ decomposes in the desired way into well-spread subgraphs G2, . . . , Gk with
parameters λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λk. The claim then follows by observing that (i) no edges
join B1 to A′; and (ii) λ1 ≥ λ2 (otherwise S ∪ A2 would contradict the choice of S
maximizing |S|/|N(S)|). uunionsq
We now combining the last two results.
Corollary 1. For every bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E) of order n satisfying the
assumption of Proposition 1, there exists a payoff vector p ≥ 0 such that pi + pj ≥ 1
for ij ∈ E and p(L) ≤ 14n for any independent set L ⊆ A ∪ B. In addition, p can be
chosen so as to satisfy p ≥ 12 on A.
Proof. The result follow immediately from Lemma 1 and Proposition 1. Note that if
p is chosen as p ≡ 1− λi on Ai, then p ≥ 12 indeed. uunionsq
As we will see, the assumption of Proposition 1 is not really restrictive for our
purposes. A (connected) component C of a graph G is even (odd) if C has an even
(odd) number of vertices. A graph G = (N,E) is factor-critical if for every vertex
v ∈ V (G), the graph G− v has a perfect matching. We recall the well-known Gallai–
Edmonds Theorem (see [21]) for characterizing the structure of maximum matchings
in G; see also Figure 2. There exists a (unique) subset A ⊆ N , called a Tutte set, such
that
– every even component of G−A has a perfect matching;
– every odd component of G−A is factor-critical;
– every maximum matching in G is the union of a perfect matching in each even
component, a nearly perfect matching in each odd component and a matching that
matches A (completely) to the odd components.
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Aeven
odd
Fig. 2. Tutte set A splitting G into even and odd components (possibly single nodes).
We are now ready to derive our first main result.7
Theorem 1. Let G = (N,E) be a graph of order n. Then αG ≤ 14n.
Proof. Let A ⊆ N be a Tutte set. Contract each odd component in G−A to a single
vertex and let B denote the resulting set of vertices. The subgraph G¯ induced by A∪B
then satisfies the assumption of Corollary 1. Let p¯ ∈ R|A|+|B| be the corresponding
payoff vector. We define p ∈ Rn by setting pi = p¯i for every vertex i ∈ A and every
vertex i that corresponds to an odd component of size 1 in G − A. All other vertices
get pj = 12 .
It is straightforward to check that p ≥ 0 and pi+pj ≥ 1. Indeed, p¯ ≥ 12 everywhere
except on B, so the only critical edges ij have i ∈ A and j a singleton odd component.
But in this case pi + pj = p¯i + p¯j ≥ 1. Thus we are left to prove that for every
independent set L ⊆ N , p(L) ≤ 14n. Let B0 denote the set of singleton odd components
i ∈ B, L0 := (L∩A)∪ (L∩B0) and n0 := |A|+ |B|. Clearly, L0 is an independent set
in the bipartite graph G¯ , and p = p¯ on L0. We thus conclude that p(L0) ≤ 14n0.
Next let us analyze L ∩ C where C ⊆ N\A is an even component. C is perfectly
matchable, implying that L contains at most |C|/2 vertices of C. So p(L∩C) ≤ 14 |C|.
A similar argument applies to odd components. Let C be an odd component in G−A
of size at least 3. Then certainly L cannot contain all vertices of C, so there exists
some i ∈ C\L. Since C is factor-critical, C\i is perfectly matchable, implying that L
can contain at most half of C\i. Thus |L∩C| ≤ (|C|−1)/2 and p(L∩C) ≤ (|C|−1)/4.
Summarizing, n−n0 = |N |− (|A|+ |B|) is the sum over all |C|, where C is an even
component plus the sum over all |C| − 1 where C is an odd component, and p(L\L0)
is at most a 14 fraction of this, finishing the proof. uunionsq
We like to mention that both decompositions that we use to define the payoff p
can be computed efficiently. For the Edmonds–Gallai decomposition, this is a well-
known fact (see, for example, [21]). For the decomposition into well-spread subgraphs,
this follows from the observation that deciding whether maxS
|S|
|N(S)| ≤ r is equivalent
to minS r|N(S)| − |S| ≥ 0, which amounts to minimizing the submodular function
f(S) = r|N(S)| − |S|; see, for example, [25] for a strongly polynomial-time algorithm
or Appendix A.
2.2 No Minimal Winning Sets of Size 3
We now deal shortly with the more general case where there are, in addition, minimal
winning coalitions of size 4 or larger. First recall how the payoff p that we proposed
7 For n is odd, the upper bound in Theorem 1 can be slightly strengthened to n
2−1
4n
[17].
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in Corollary 1 works. For a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B,E), split into well-spread
subgraphs Gi = (Ai ∪Bi, Ei) with parameter λi, we let p ≡ λi on Bi. So for λi < 14 , p
may be infeasible, that is, we may encounter winning coalitions W of size 4 or larger
with p(W ) < 1. This problem can easily be remedied by raising p a bit on each Bi
and decreasing it accordingly on Ai. Indeed, the standard (λ, 1 − λ) allocation rule
proposed in Lemma 1 is based on the simple fact that λ(1 − λ) ≤ 14 , which gives us
some flexibility for modification in the case where λ is small. More precisely, defining
the payoff to be p :≡ 14(1−λ) > 14 on B and 1 − p < 34 on A for a bipartite graph
(G = (A∪B,E), well-spread with parameter λ, would work as well and thus solve the
problem. Indeed, the unique independent set L that maximizes p(L) is L = B in this
case, which gives p(L) = p(B) = |B|/(4(1− λ)) = 14n.
There is one thing that needs to be taken care of. Namely, in Proposition 1 we
assumed that G = (A ∪ B,E) has no isolated vertices, an assumption that can be
made without loss of generality if we only have 2-element winning coalitions. Now we
may have isolated vertices that are part of winning coalitions of size 4 or larger. But this
does not cause any problems either. We simply assign p := 14 to these isolated vertices
to ensure that indeed all winning coalitions W have p(W ) ≥ 1. Formally, this can also
be seen as an extension of our decomposition: if G = (A ∪ B,E) contains isolated
vertices, then they are all contained in B (once we assume that A can be completely
matched into B). So the set of isolated vertices can be seen as a “degenerate” well-
spread final subgraph (Ak∪Bk, Ek) with Ak = ∅ and parameter λk = 0. Our proposed
payoff p ≡ 14(1−λk) would then indeed assign p = 14 to all isolated vertices.
It remains to observe that when we pass to general graphs, no further problems
arise. Indeed, all that happens is that vertices in even and odd components get payoffs
p = 12 which certainly does no harm to the feasibility of p. Thus we have proved the
following result.
Corollary 2. Let (N, v) be a simple game with no minimal winning coalition of size 3.
Then α(N, v) ≤ 14n.
We end this section with the complementary case where all minimal winning coali-
tions have size 3.
Proposition 2. Let (N, v) be a simple game with all minimal winning coalitions of
size 3. Then α(N, v) ≤ 14n.
Proof. We try p :≡ 13 , which is certainly feasible. If this yields max p(L) ≤ 14n, we
are done. Otherwise, there exists a losing coalition L ⊆ N with p(L) = 13 |L| > 14n,
or equivalently, |L| > 34n. In this case we use an alternative payoff p˜ given by p˜ ≡ 1
on N\L and p˜ ≡ 0 on L. Since |N \ L| < 14n, this ensures p˜(L˜) < 14n for any losing
coalition L˜. On the other hand, p˜ is feasible, since a winning coalition W cannot be
completely contained in L, that is, there exists a player i ∈W with p˜i = 1 and hence
p˜(W ) ≥ 1. uunionsq
We note that Proposition 2 is a pure existence result. To compute p˜ it requires to
solve a maximum independent set problem in 3-uniform hypergraphs, which is NP-
hard. This can be seen from a reduction from the maximum independent set problem
in graphs, which is well known to be NP-hard (see [14]). Given a graph G = (V,E),
construct a 3-uniform hypergraph G¯ as follows. Add n = |V | new vertices labeled
1, . . . , n and extend each edge e = ij ∈ E to n edges {i, j, 1}, . . . , {i, j, n} in G¯. It is
readily seen that a maximum independent set of vertices in G¯ (that is, a set of vertices
that does not contain any hyperedge) consists of the n new vertices plus a maximum
independent set in G.
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3 Minimal Winning Coalitions of Arbitrary Size
In this section we try to combine the ideas for the two complementary cases to derive
an upper bound α ≤ 27 for the general case. The payoffs p that we consider will all
satisfy p ≥ 14 so that only winning coalitions of size 2 and 3 are of interest. The basic
idea is to start with a bipartite graph (A ∪ B,E) representing the size 2 winning
coalitions and a payoff satisfying all these. Standard payoffs that we use satisfy p ≥ 14
on B and p ≥ 12 on A. Hence we have to worry only about 3-element winning coalitions
contained in B. We seek to satisfy these by raising the payoff of some vertices in B
without spending too much in total.
More precisely, consider a bipartite graph G = (A∪B,E) representing the winning
coalitions of size 2. As before, we assume that A can be completely matched into B,
so that our decomposition into well-spread subgraphs Gi = (Ai∪Bi, Ei) applies (with
possibly the last subgraph Gk = (Ak ∪ Bk, Ek) having Ak = ∅ and Bk consisting
of isolated points as explained at the end of the previous section). Recall the payoff
λ¯i :≡ 14(1−λi) on Bi and 1 − λ¯i on Ai defined for the proof of Corollary 2. We first
consider the following payoff p¯ :≡ 1− λ¯i on Ai and p¯ :≡ λ¯i on Bi for λi ≥ 14 , so λ¯i ≥ 13 .
For subgraphs with λi < 14 (including possibly a final λk = 0) we define p¯ ≡ 23 on Ai
and p¯ ≡ 13 on Bi. Thus p¯ ≥ 13 everywhere, in particular, p¯ is feasible with respect to
all winning coalitions of size at least 3.
Let L¯ be a losing coalition with maximum p¯(L). We define an alternative payoff p˜
as follows: For λi ≥ 14 we set p˜ :≡ 1− λ¯i on Ai, p˜ :≡ λ¯i on B ∩ L¯ and p˜ :≡ 12 on Bi\L¯.
For λi < 14 we set p˜ :≡ 34 on Ai, p˜ :≡ 14 on Bi ∩ L¯ and p˜ :≡ 12 on Bi\L¯.
Clearly, both p¯ and p˜ are feasible. We claim that a suitable combination of these
two yields the desired upper bound.
Lemma 2. For p := 37 p¯+
4
7 p˜ we get α = maxL p(L) ≤ 27n.
Proof. Let L¯ as above be a losing coalition with maximum p¯-value. Let ρi ∈ [0, 1]
such that |L¯ ∩ Bi| = (1− ρi)|Bi| = (1− ρi)(1− λi)ni. For λi ≥ 14 we then get (using
well-spreadedness)
p¯(L¯i) ≤
[
ρiλi(1− λ¯i) + (1− ρi)(1− λi)λ¯i
]
ni. (3)
For λi ≥ 14 , the alternative payoff p˜ equals p¯ on Ai∪Bi except that vertices in Bi\L¯ are
raised to 12 . So a losing coalition L with Li := L∩(Ai∪Bi) obviously has p˜(Li) ≤ p˜(Bi)
(as vertices in Bi are relatively more profitable than vertices in Ai), i.e.,
p˜(Li) =
[
(1− ρi)(1− λi)λ¯i + ρi(1− λi)1
2
]
ni, (4)
because, by definition of p˜, exactly ρi(1− λi)ni vertices in Bi are raised to 12 . Hence
3
7
p¯(L¯i) +
4
7
p˜(Li) ≤ ρi
[
3
7
λi(1− λ¯i) + 4
7
(1− λi)1
2
]
ni + (1− ρi)(1− λi)λ¯i
(
3
7
+
4
7
)
ni
(5)
≤ ρi
[
2
7
λi +
2
7
(1− λi)
]
ni + (1− ρi)1
4
ni ≤ 2
7
ni.
where we have used 1− λ¯i ≤ 23 and (1− λi)λ¯i = 14 .
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For λi < 14 (i.e., λ¯i <
1
3 ), we conclude similarly that
p¯(L¯i) ≤
[
ρiλi
2
3
+ (1− ρi)(1− λi)1
3
]
ni (6)
and
p˜(Li) =
[
(1− ρi)(1− λi)1
4
+ ρi(1− λi)1
2
]
ni. (7)
Thus,
3
7
p¯(L¯i) +
4
7
p˜(Li) ≤
[
ρi
(
2
7
λi +
2
7
(1− λi)
)
+ (1− ρi)(1− λi)
(
1
7
+
1
7
)]
ni (8)
≤
[
ρi
2
7
+ (1− ρi)2
7
]
ni =
2
7
ni. (9)
Now the claim follows by observing that p(L) = 37 p¯(L) +
4
7 p˜(L) ≤ 37 p¯(L¯) + 47 p˜(L). uunionsq
Hence we obtained the following theorem.
Theorem 2. For every simple game (N, v), α(N, v) ≤ 27n.
4 Complete Simple Games
Recall that a simple game (N, v) is complete if for a suitable ordering, say, 1  2 
· · ·  n indicating that i is more powerful than i + 1 in the sense that v(S ∪ {i}) ≥
v(S ∪ {i+ 1}) for any coalition S ⊆ N\{i, j}. Intuitively, the class of complete simple
games is “closer” to weighted voting games than general simple games. The next result
quantifies this expectation.
Theorem 3. A complete simple game (N, v) has α ≤ √n lnn.
Proof. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of players and assume without loss of generality
that 1  2  · · ·  n. Let k ∈ N be the largest number such that {k, . . . , n} is winning.
For i = 1, . . . , k, let si denote the smallest size of a winning coalition in {i, . . . , n}.
Define pi := 1/si for i = 1, . . . , k and pi := pk for i = k + 1, . . . , n. Thus, obviously,
p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pk = · · · = pn.
Consider a winning coalitionW ⊆ N and let i be the first player inW (with respect
to ). If |W | ≤ √n, then si ≤ |W | ≤
√
n and hence p(W ) ≥ pi = 1si ≥ 1√n . On the
other hand, if |W | > √n, then p(W ) > √npk ≥
√
n 1n =
1√
n
.
For a losing coalition L ⊆ N , we conclude that |L ∩ {1, . . . , i}| ≤ si − 1 (otherwise
L would dominate the winning coalition of size si in {i, . . . , n}). So p(L) is bounded
by
max
k∑
i=1
xi
1
si
subject to
i∑
j=1
xj ≤ si − 1, i = 1, . . . , k.
The optimal solution of this maximization problem is easily seen to be x1 = s1−1, xi =
si − si−1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ k. Hence
p(L) ≤ (s1 − 1) 1
s1
+ (s2 − s1) 1
s2
+ · · ·+ (sk − sk−1) 1
sk
≤ 1
2
+ · · ·+ 1
sk
≤ lnn.
Summarizing, we obtain p(L)/p(W ) ≤ √n lnn, as claimed. uunionsq
9
In [11] it is conjectured that α = O(
√
n) holds for complete simple games. We
direct the reader to [11] for further details, including a lower bound of order
√
n as
well as specific subclasses of complete simple games for which α = O(
√
n) can be
proven.
5 Algorithmic Aspects
A fundamental question concerns the complexity of our original problem (1). For
general simple games this depends on how the game in question is given, and we refer
to Section 1 for a discussion. Here we concentrate on the “graphic” case where the
minimal winning coalitions are given as the edges of a graph G.
Proposition 3. For a bipartite graph G = (N,E) we can compute αG in polynomial
time.
Proof. Let P ⊆ Rn denote the set of feasible payoffs (satisfying p ≥ 0 and pi + pj ≥ 1
for ij ∈ E). For α ∈ R we let
Pα := {p ∈ P | p(L) ≤ α for all independent L ⊆ N}.
Thus αG = min{α | Pα 6= ∅}. The separation problem for Pα (for any given α) is
efficiently solvable. Given p ∈ Rn, we can check feasibility and we can check whether
max{p(L) | L ⊆ N independent} ≤ α by solving a corresponding maximum weight
independent set problem in the bipartite graph G. Thus we can, for any given α ∈ R,
apply the ellipsoid method to either compute some p ∈ Pα or conclude that Pα = ∅.
Binary search then exhibits the minimum value for which Pα is non-empty. Note
that binary search works indeed in polynomial time since the optimal α has size
polynomially bounded in n. The latter follows by observing that
α = min{a | pi + pj ≥ 1 ∀ij ∈ E, p(L)− a ≤ 0 ∀L ⊆ N independent, p ≥ 0} (10)
can be computed by solving a linear system of n constraints defining an optimal basic
solution of the above linear program. uunionsq
The above proof also applies to all other classes of graphs, such as claw-free graphs
and generalizations thereof (see [5]) in which finding a weighted maximum independent
set is polynomial-time solvable. In general, however, computing α is NP-hard (just like
computing a maximum independent set).
Proposition 4. Computing αG for arbitrary graphs G is NP-hard.
Proof. Given G = (N,E) with maximum independent set of size k, let G′ = (N ′, E′)
and G′′ = (N ′′, E′′) be two disjoint copies of G. For each i′ ∈ N ′ and j′′ ∈ N ′′ we add
an edge i′j′′ if and only if i = j or ij ∈ E and call the resulting graph G∗ = (N∗, E∗).
(In graph theoretic terminology G∗ is also known as the strong product of G with
P2.) We claim that αG∗ = k/2 (thus showing that computing αG∗ is as difficult as
computing k).
First note that the independent sets in G∗ are exactly the sets L∗ ⊆ N∗ that arise
from an independent set L ⊆ N in G by splitting L into two complementary sets L1
and L2 and defining L∗ := L′1 ∪ L′′2 . Hence, p ≡ 12 on N∗ yields max p(L∗) = k/2
where the maximum is taken over all independent sets L∗ ⊆ N∗ in G∗. This shows
that αG∗ ≤ k/2.
Conversely, let p∗ be any feasible payoff in G∗ (that is, p∗ ≥ 0 and p∗i + p∗j ≥ 1 for
all ij ∈ E∗). Let L ⊆ N be a maximum independent set of size k in G and construct
L∗ by including for each i ∈ L either i′ or i′′ in L∗, whichever has p-value at least 12 .
Then, by construction, L∗ is an independent set in G∗ with p∗(L∗) ≥ k/2, showing
that αG∗ ≥ k/2. uunionsq
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Summarizing, for graphic simple games, computing αG is as least as hard as com-
puting the size of a maximum independent in G. For our last result we assume that a
is a fixed integer, that is, a is not part of the input.
Proposition 5. For every fixed a > 0, it is possible to decide if αG ≤ a in polynomial
time for an arbitrary graph G = (N,E).
Proof. Let k = 2da+ e for some  > 0. By brute-force, we can check in O(n2k) time if
N contains 2k vertices {u1, . . . , uk} ∪ {v1, . . . , vk} that induce k disjoint copies of P2,
that is, paths Pi = uivi of length 2 for i = 1, . . . , k with no edges joining any two of
these paths. If so, then the condition p(ui) + p(vi) ≥ 1 implies that one of ui, vi, say
ui, must receive a payoff p(ui) ≥ 12 , and hence U = {u1, . . . , uk} has p(U) ≥ k/2 > a.
As U is an independent set, we conclude that α(G) > a.
Now assume that G does not contain k disjoint copies of P2 as an induced subgraph,
that is, G is kP2-free. For every s ≥ 1, the number of maximal independent sets in a
sP2-free graphs is nO(s) due to a result of Balas and Yu [1]. Tsukiyama, Ide, Ariyoshi,
and Shirakawa [30] show how to enumerate all maximal independent sets of a graph
G on n vertices and m edges using time O(nm) per independent set. Hence we can
find all maximal independent sets of G and thus solve, in polynomial time, the linear
program 10. Then it remains to check if the solution found satisfies α ≤ a. uunionsq
6 Conclusions
The two main open problems are to prove the upper bound of 14n for all simple games
and to tighten the upper bound for complete simple games to O(
√
n). In order to
classify simple games, many more subclasses of simple games have been identified in
the literature. Besides the two open problems, no optimal bounds for α are known for
other subclasses of simple games, such as strong, proper, or constant-sum games, that
is, where v(S)+v(N\S) ≥ 1, v(S)+v(N\S) ≤ 1, or v(S)+v(N\S) = 1 for all S ⊆ N ,
respectively.
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A Finding a Decomposition into Well-Spread Graphs
As mentioned, for the efficient implementation of the procedure for splitting a bipar-
tite graph into well-spread subgraphs, all we need to solve is maxS⊆A |S|/|N(S)| in
bipartite graphs G = (A∪B,E), and this is equivalent to minimizing the submodular
function f(S) = r|N(S)| − |S|. Instead of using a known algorithm for solving the
latter, we present a direct algorithm.
Lemma 3. Consider a bipartite graph G = (A ∪B,E) of order n such that A can be
matched into B. Then we can find maxS⊆A |S|/|N(S)| in time O(n6 log n).
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Proof. Let 0 < r1 < r2 < · · · < rk ≤ 1 be a complete list of all fractions in [0, 1] of
the form r = p/q with p, q ∈ {1, . . . , n}. We compute maxS⊆A |S|/|N(S)| by binary
search. To check whether there exists S ⊆ A with |S|/|N(S)| > p/q, we construct a
bipartite graph G¯ = (A¯∪ B¯, E¯), where A¯ consists of q disjoint copies of A, B¯ consists
of p disjoint copies of B, and each copy of A is connected to each copy of B in exactly
the same way as A is connected to B in G.
We claim that
∃S ⊆ A : |S|/|N(S)| > p/q (11)
is equivalent to
∃S¯ ⊆ A¯ : |S¯| > |N¯(S¯)|, (12)
where N¯(S¯) is the neighborhood of S¯ ⊆ A¯ in G¯.
Indeed, if (11) holds, let S¯ ⊆ A¯ consist of all q copies of S, so that |S¯| = q|S|. The
neighborhood of S¯ in G¯ then consists of all p copies of N(S), so |N¯(S¯)| = p|N(S)|,
thus (12) holds. Conversely, if (12) holds and S¯ ⊆ A¯ satisfies |S¯| > |N¯(S¯)|, we may
assume without loss of generality that S¯ consists of q copies of some set S ⊆ A.
(Indeed, note that if S¯ contains any copy of some i ∈ A, we may add all other copies
of i to S¯ without affecting N¯(S¯) - and hence without affecting |S¯| > |N¯(S¯)|.) But then
N¯(S¯) simply consists of all p copies of N(S) and we get (11).
Since (12) can be decided by solving a matching problem in G¯, a graph of size n2,
this finishes the proof. (Recall that matching problems of size n can be solved in time
O(n3) (see, for example [21]). uunionsq
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